Algunas problemáticas en la interpretación schopenhaueriana de la cosa en sí frente al idealismo trascendental de Kant

Authors

Abstract

This article aims to elucidate some hits and misses about Schopenhauer’s conception of the thing-in-itself making a chronological regression analysis or regressus from his philosophy to Kant’s transcendental idealism. With this it is expected to show the way in which Schopenhauer seems to construe the thing-in-itself under the point of view of a pre-kantian dogmatic idealism comparable to transcendental realism, which brings important consequences both to his claim about being the sole heir of Kant’s transcendental idealism, as well as for his metaphysics of the will-to-live and pessimistic ethical system.

Keywords:

thing-in-itself, representation, transcendental idealism, will-to-live, pessimism.