This article deals with how Turing Machine Functionalism turns out to be compatible with a form of Dualism, which involves that strong AI is not close to the original Materialism that inspired it in the nineteenth century. To support this thesis, I argue that there is a compelling coincidence between Descartes' philosophy and this version of Functionalism, since the former holds that it is conceivable/possible to separate mind and body, while the latter holds that it is not strictly necessary that mental states are realized by the physical properties of real cogs and machines.
González, R. (2011). Machines without gears and bodies without minds. How dualistic is the functionalism of the Turing-machine?. Revista De Filosofía, 67, Pág. 183–200. Retrieved from https://pedagogiaderecho.uchile.cl/index.php/RDF/article/view/18134
